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Part-Time Work, Fixed-Term Contracts, 
and the Returns to Experience
* 
 
Using data from Spanish Social Security records, we investigate the returns to experience in 
different flexible work arrangements, including part-time and full-time work, and permanent 
and fixed-term contracts. We use a trivariate random effects model which consists of a three-
equation system that is estimated simultaneously by Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques. 
Our results indicate that there is a large pay gap for working part-time which persists many 
years after having resumed full-time work. We also find that working part-time involves lower 
returns to experience than standard full-time employment and thus a substantial negative 
wage differential for those employed part-time accumulates over time. Finally, we find that 
heterogeneity exist by contract type and motherhood status. 
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I.  Introduction 
In the last three decades, marginal work arrangements involving part-time (PT) work or 
fixed-term contracts have surged in many Continental European countries as a means to 
increase flexibility in the labour market.  At the same time, regular jobs in these countries 
have maintained their strong employment protection.  As a consequence, many researchers 
and policy makers are concerned of a deepening segmentation of the labour market, with 
insiders (those with permanent full-time contracts) enjoying better work conditions than 
outsiders (those under flexible work).  At the macroeconomic level, this is particularly 
worrisome if the coexistence of two types of contracts gives rise to a soaring unemployment 
rate as the one observed in the recent economic crisis in Spain—as Bentolila et. al., 2010, 
demonstrate in a recent paper using a calibrated search and matching model.  At the 
microeconomic level, the concern is that those who are employed under a flexible work 
arrangement may experience worse work conditions than those with permanent full-time 
contracts.  The issue is particularly relevant for female workers, since women tend to be over-
represented in flexible work arrangements.
1  Supporters of such type of work arrangements 
argue, however, that they are helpful in reconciling market and family work, or that they 
work as stepping-stones from non-employment into standard employment arrangements.   
This debate has led to a large literature estimating the effect of flexible work, 
especially PT work, on women’s labour outcomes.  Within this literature, many researchers 
have analyzed the hourly wage differences between PT workers and their full-time (FT) 
counterparts.  A frequent concern when estimating this difference is that workers in flexible 
work arrangements may have different unobserved productivity, tastes and preferences for 
work than those with more standard types of jobs.  One way to address the unobserved 
heterogeneity problem is to use panel data and to estimate a fixed-effects-‘within’ estimator, 
                                                 
1 See Blank, 1998; Aaronson and French, 2004; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008; and Booth and Wood, 2008, 
among others, for papers analyzing the PT/FT hourly wage differential.  And Jimeno and Toharia, 1993; 
Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Booth et al., 2002; Dolado, et al., 2002, and De la Rica, 2004 for papers 
analyzing the hourly wage differential between fixed-term and permanent contract workers. 3 
 
in which case, the effect of PT on wages is identified through those workers who switch 
status (see Booth and Wood, 2008; Connolly and Gregory, 2009; and Fernández-Kranz and 
Rodríguez-Planas (forthcoming)).
2  However, three additional concerns (not addressed in the 
literature until now) emerge.  First, PT workers may have, on average, very different work 
histories than FT workers.  They are likely to have experienced prior PT spells and 
interruptions and they may have more or less of their experience obtained under fixed-term 
contracts.  Second, the contract type decisions may depend on past and current PT decisions.  
If the wage returns to experience differ by the work arrangement in which it is obtained, and 
by the timing and sequencing of the obtained experience, differences in histories between PT 
and FT workers should be taken into account to analyze the PT/FT wage differential.  Finally, 
it must not be neglected that the work history is a sum of many decisions in the past, for 
which selection based on observables and unobserved heterogeneity may again have played 
an important role.  The central point of this article is to account for experience and its 
dimensions in such a comprehensive way.  
Our paper is the first to estimate the wage effect of PT work for female workers after 
accounting for individual heterogeneity, the selection into employment, PT work and contract 
decisions based on time-constant unobserved heterogeneity, and dealing comprehensively 
with differences in work experience while accounting for their endogeneity with regard to 
observed and time-constant unobserved heterogeneity.  We address these econometric issues 
by modelling the wage, the employment, and contract decisions in a trivariate random effects 
model.  More precisely, we follow  Buchinsky, Fougère, Kramarz, and Tchernis, 2010, 
(BFKT, hereafter) and use an econometric specification in which the employment decision—
in FT work, PT work, or non-employment (NE)—, the type of contract—fixed-term versus 
permanent—, and the level of wages are jointly determined.  The econometric approach gives 
                                                 
2 Alternatively, Hirsch, 2005, uses multiple short panels with two observations per worker (one year apart) to 
estimate the effect of switching between FT and PT status on wage changes.   4 
 
rise to three equations estimated simultaneously: (1) a Mincer’s wage equation, (2) a reduced 
form contract-type equation, and (3) a reduced form participation/FT/PT employment 
equation.  The reduced form equations allow for state dependence and duration dependence.  
In this approach, both experience (in both FT and PT work) and contract type are 
endogenised with regard to time-constant individual heterogeneity, because they are direct 
outcomes of the employment and type of contract decisions, respectively.  Hence, the model 
accounts for the potential selection biases that stem from these endogenous decisions.  A 
further advantage of our approach is that we obtain information on the direction and strength 
of the possible selection based on unobserved heterogeneity.  In contrast to BFKT, we have 
to make the assumption that idiosyncratic errors are independent across equations, because 
we lack the exclusion restrictions that would allow adding correlation terms for the 
idiosyncratic errors.   
We use Social Security records panel data from 1996 to 2006 from the Spanish 
Continuous Survey Working History, CSWH hereafter, and estimate the model for all women.  
Heterogeneity analysis by whether women will become mothers or not is also performed to 
disentangle the role of PT work as a family-work-reconciling device.  To estimate the joint 
posterior distribution of the model’s parameters, we employ Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) methods.   
Empirically, our paper finds the following three results.  First, we find that there is a 
large wage differential of working PT, and that heterogeneity exist by contract type and 
motherhood status.  For example, six years after having worked PT a female worker has an 
hourly wage that is about 15% lower than that of a comparable woman who has worked full-
time.  The cumulative wage differential is smaller for mothers and larger for childless women 
working under a permanent contract.  This heterogeneity is probably the result of a liberal 
new Spanish law that grants women with small children the right to request a work-week 
reduction (with a proportional reduction in their salary) and protects those with a permanent 5 
 
contract against dismissal.  A second important finding of this paper is that the PT/FT hourly 
wage differential persists even after many years of having resumed full-time work, especially 
in the case of women without children.  This persistence ought to raise concerns about the 
long lasting consequences of PT work for women’s careers.  Finally, our results show the 
need to explicitly control for past experience in different work arrangements when attempting 
to estimate the effects across different contract types.  We find that the magnitude of the 
estimated returns changes markedly when we account for this factor, indicating that the PT 
employment history as well as interruptions during the course of one’s career are important 
for workers’ wage trajectory.   
This paper is closer to Connolly and Gregory, 2009, in that it examines the 
implications of switching to PT work for women’s subsequent earnings trajectories; and to 
Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas (forthcoming) in that it analyzes the PT/FT wage 
differential within two groups of workers, those with and without a permanent contract.   
Methodologically, our paper contributes to the literature in at least five ways.  First, we 
consider the joint determination of the two most important forms of flexible work: PT work 
and fixed-term contracts.  This is important if the selection into one form of flexible work 
depends on the experience in the other.  Second, we take into account individual 
heterogeneity, differences in work histories, and endogeneity of the work history, the current 
work arrangement, and employment with regard to time-constant unobserved heterogeneity.  
Third, we account for history in a flexible way, which is crucial if the effects of working in a 
particular state persist across time.  Fourth, we disentangle not only the current but also the 
cumulative wage effects of flexible work arrangements, which give rise to important dynamic 
aspects of this type of work.  Fifth, we are able to distinguish between the wage differential 
associated with flexible work arrangements and the `motherhood pay gap´ as our analysis is 
also done separately by motherhood status. 6 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
econometric specification and estimation methodology. Sections 3 and 4 present the data and 
the empirical results, respectively.  Section 5 shows the sensitivity analysis.  Concluding 
remarks are in Section 6.  
 
II.  The Econometric Specification and Estimation 
The model consists of a wage equation and two selection equations: a contract-type equation 
and an employment-status equation.  The wage equation is a linear equation of the log hourly 
wage implementing a flexible specification for the work history distinguishing FT 
employment, PT employment, and non-employment, as well as permanent and fixed-term 
contracts.  The contract equation is a dynamic random effects probit equation modelling the 
probability of a permanent and a fixed-term contract for each period.  The employment 
equation is a dynamic random effects ordered probit equation modelling the decision between 
NE, PT, and FT.  Individual specific random effects in all three equations and their potential 
correlations across equations serve to capture time-constant unobserved heterogeneity and 
selection based on it.  This is important, as selection based on time-constant unobservables is 
likely to be an issue and would lead to biased results in a standard (single equation) RE 
model.
3  The three-equation model accounts for such—potential—selection effects.  Using 
this approach we also obtain information on the direction and strength of the selection based 
on unobservables which one would not have obtained when using an approach with a single 
equation like a standard FE approach.    
This approach is methodologically similar to the approach BFKZ use to study the 
returns to seniority in the U.S.  With regard to the idiosyncratic error terms, our model is 
                                                 
3 If, for example, some women are strongly devoted to market work, this unobservable characteristic will, in 
each period, increase their probability to work full-time and it is also likely to be positively related to the wage 
obtained, e.g. through being highly productive at work.  Another example is that it is likely that having low 
unobserved “soft skills” will decrease the probability to obtain a permanent contract and also have a negative 
effect on wages. 7 
 
more restrictive than their model as we assume independence of the three idiosyncratic error 
terms.  This is a necessary assumption because we need to include a regressor on the current 
PT status into the wage equation.  In this case we could only model dependences between the 
idiosyncratic errors if we had instruments involving variation over time and over individuals 
for both selection equations, which we do not have in our data.  With regard to the 
employment equation, we extend the model of BFKZ by introducing PT as a third 
employment status and then using an ordered probit model for the employment equation.      
The Three-Equation Model 
The wage equation is a random effects model of the natural logarithm of the deflated hourly 
wage of individual i in quarter t on the current PT status, the current contract status (FIX), the 
work history (H
W) and control variables: 
(1)   ln Wit = β
W
0  + β
W
1 PTit + β
W














The way the work history is modelled builds on the specification suggested by Light and 
Ureta, 1995.
4  It is summarised by a vector H
W which collects the employment status and the 
contract status each quarter from the year before the current period as far back as the sample 
allows in a very flexible way.  This is done by defining an array of dummies for non-
employment (NElag1 to NElag40), for PT employment (PTlag1 to Ptlag40) and for fixed-
term contract status (FIXlag1 to FIXlag40).
5  Such dummies can equal zero for two reasons: 
(1) if the woman is not in that state in the current year (thus if both the NE and the PT 
dummy equal zero, the women would be in FT); or (2) if the dummy refers to a year before 
the individual is observed in the sample.  To distinguish these two cases, an array of dummies 
capturing whether the lag is observed or not is added.  We allow for some interactions 
between contract-type and employment-status. Control variables x
W include information on 
                                                 
4 Light and Ureta, 1995, use information on the share of weeks worked in each year in their model, but they do 
not distinguish between PT and FT work and by contract-types. 
5 One concern is that the flexibility of our model leads to multicolinearity, making difficult parameters’ 
identification.  To address this, we have re-estimated the model with a less flexible estimation.  The results from 
this less flexible specification were consistent with those presented in the paper. 8 
 
the individual’s age, education, and the age of the youngest child.  It also includes 
information on the region’s unemployment rate and GDP growth, as well as the year and the 
season.  For the exact specification of the model see the Appendix Table A.1.
6 
The contract equation is a dynamic random effects probit model of a fixed-term 
contract dummy on a PT dummy, the work history H
C and control variables: 
(2) FIXit =  І (FIXit






















C and the vector x
C model the work history and the control variables following 
the same structure as in the wage equation.  As H
C includes the first lag of the contract-type 
variable and also earlier lags, the contract-type equation allows for state dependence and 
duration dependence.  Note that the work-history not only includes contract-history but also 
lagged PT and NE dummies.  The wage equation and the contract-type equation are only 
estimated if the woman is employed in the respective period. 
The employment equation is a dynamic random effects ordered probit model of the 
employment variable E (which equals 2 for FT, 1 for PT and 0 for NE) on the work history 
H


















where E* denotes the latent variable.  Work history and control variables are modelled 
following the same concept as in the other equations.  Again work history includes the 
employment-status history as well as the contract-status history and state dependence and 
duration dependence are allowed for.  The initial conditions are modelled as suggested by 
Wooldridge, 2005; thus the values of the left-hand side variables for the initial period are 
added to the equations in each period.  
                                                 
6 We do not include information on occupation, industry and seniority among the control variables because these 
are likely to be outcomes of our regressors of interest (i.e. the employment history). 9 
 






i and these are 
assumed to follow a joint normal distribution N(0,Σ) which allows for correlation among 
them.  The current employment status, the current contract-type, experience in FT and PT 
work, as well as experience in a specific contract type are endogenised with regard to time-
constant unobserved characteristics.  The idiosyncratic errors are assumed to be 





it ~N(0,1),  ε
E
it ~N(0,1).   
Identification 
Identification of this model depends on functional form restrictions and time-varying 
covariates (Hyslop, 1999).  Identification could be supported by exclusion restrictions but in 
a dynamic context it is particularly difficult to find suitable exclusion restrictions because the 
variable or its effect has to change with the individual and with the time period (see for 
example Heckman and Navarro, 2007).  This problem is not uncommon in this literature, and 
it is often addressed by using children and marital status as instruments—see Ermisch and 
Wright, 1993; Blank, 1998; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008, among others—.  However, it is 
well established that “this is a very strong assumption that may not, in reality, be any better 
than the exogeneity assumption that this is supposed to replace” (Manning and Petrongolo, 
page F33, Economic Journal 2008).  Aaronson and French, 2004, are the only ones that we 
know of to use an alternative instrument for worked hours, the work disincentive of the US 
Social Security system.  They are able to isolate exogenous shifts into PT employment 
resulting from changes in Social Security rules for older men and women.   
Note that in our model identification comes from both the cross-sectional and the 
time-series dimensions, while a FE approach only uses the time series dimension for 
identification (“within identification”).  One of the advantages of our data set is its size, 
which is much larger (in terms of observations and years) than what is standard in the 
literature.  This is important because it adds sufficient time-series variation to support 
identification as many women switch between states during the sample period.  Moreover, 10 
 
the sizeable cross-sectional dimension facilitates the use of differences between women who 
follow distinct sequences of employment decisions over their working life.  To use cross-
sectional identification along with time-series identification increases the efficiency of the 
estimator.  This may be important in particular if a very flexible specification with history 
effects is used (e.g. modelling different forms of work arrangements in all periods).  
Estimation 
To estimate the model, we use Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques. 
This approach avoids simulating integrals and allows a numerically robust estimation of the 
flexible model specification.  The goal of this technique is to obtain a sample from the 
posterior distribution of the model parameters.  From a classical perspective, the mean of the 
posterior distribution converges to the point estimator from maximum likelihood estimation 
and the variance of the posterior distribution converges to the asymptotic variance of the 
point estimator in maximum likelihood estimation.  Thus, the mean of the draws may be 
interpreted as the coefficient and the standard deviation as standard errors.
7  Conjugate but 
very diffuse priors are used.  We obtain a sample of the posterior distribution of our model 
parameters by running 50,000 iterations of a Gibbs sampling algorithm. We monitor 
convergence by comparing the means at different stages of the chains. The first 10,000 
iterations are discarded (the burn-in phase).  We implemented the Gibbs sampler in Stata.  
The analysis is first done for the whole sample, and then separately for whether 
women become mothers at some point in time or are childless women.
8  The heterogeneity 
analysis by motherhood status responds to two things.  First, many mothers chose PT work as 
a means of reconciling family life and work, and thus, we want to disentangle how much this 
motivation for PT work is driving our results.  Second, the Spanish legislation gives the right 
                                                 
7 See Chib, 2008, for a survey of MCMC methods for Panel data and Train, 2003, for an overview over 
important properties of MCMC estimators. Recent applications in labour economics are BFKT, Fitzenberger et. 
al., 2010, Horny et al., 2009, and Troske and Voicu, 2010.   
8 To remain childless may be a decision which is influenced by the individual’s labour market outcome and thus 
the sample separation might be to some extend endogeneous, but we think that for an additional heterogeneity 
analysis this is not too problematic. 11 
 
to request a work-week reduction (with a proportional reduction in their salary) to mothers 
with small children (under 7 years old) and protects them against dismissal if they use this 
right while working under a permanent contract (see Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas, 
2011, for an analysis of the effects of such policy).   
 
III.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We use data from the 2006 wave of the Continuous Sample of Working Histories (hereafter 
CSWH), which is a 4% non-stratified random sample of the population registered with the 
Social Security Administration in 2006 and provides the complete labour market history of 
the selected individuals back to 1967.  It provides information on: (1) socio-demographic 
characteristics of the worker (such as, sex, education, nationality, province of residence, 
number of children in the household and their date of birth); and (2) worker’s job information 
(such as type of contract, PT status, occupation, the dates the employment spell started and 
ended, and monthly earnings).  Although not reported in the CSWH, other variables such as 
experience (in FT and PT work) and tenure can be easily calculated.  Because the CSWH 
does not have reliable information on type of contract prior to 1996, our analysis focuses on 
the years 1996 to 2006.  However, we use information back to 1985 to calculate variables 
such as workers’ initial experience.   
We focus our analysis on wage and salary workers, that is, we exclude from the 
analysis self-employed individuals.  We confine our selection to birth cohorts between 1961 
and 1978.  In addition, we restrict women in our sample to be aged between 24 and 45 years.  
The reason for dropping women younger than 24 years old is that we want to eliminate PT 
work by students—a standard restriction in the literature.  Finally, because we want to 12 
 
confine the analysis to women with a strong attachment to the labour force, we further restrict 
our sample to women who record at least three years in FT employment.
9    
This sample selection results in an unbalanced panel of 427,254 observations on 
15,138 women, of which 2,157 (14.25%) are observed working PT at some point in time 
between 1996 and 2006, and 28% are observed working under a fixed-term contract in a least 
one period.  Following most of the European literature, we classify a worker working PT if 
she works 30 hours or less each week, and FT if she works 31 or more hours each week.  We 
observe on average 34 quarters in our sample of analysis.   
Pooling all periods together, 88% of the women in our sample work FT under 
permanent contracts, 7.7% work FT under a fixed-term contract, 3.4% work PT under a 
permanent contract, and 1.3% work PT under fixed-term contract (shown in first row of 
Table 1).
10  Together with the fact that an important number of women experiences 
employment in a flexible labour market state at least once during the sample period (see 
above), this indicates that we observe a considerable number of switches between 
employment arrangements in our data.  While the average number of years of experience in 
the estimation sample in a given period is 5.43, Table 1 shows that the average experience in 
each of the four states (FT Permanent, PT Permanent, FT Fixed-term, PT Fixed-term) varies 
considerably with the current PT/FT status and current type of contract.
11  For instance, the 
average number of years of FT work experience in a permanent contract drops from 5 to 1.7 
years if the worker works FT but under different type of contracts.  These descriptive 
statistics suggest that women working under fixed-term contracts have very different labour 
market histories than those working under permanent contracts, not only with regard to past 
contract states but also with regard the past PT states.      
                                                 
9 Furthermore, we restrict our sample to women who are observed for at least four quarters.  Finally, we do not 
use the first year for our estimation but just for the construction of the state dependence variables. 
10 For a compact presentation, we use years in our tables, but we obtain the results based on a panel data set in 
quarters. 
11 Although one individual can appear under different categories in different waves of the panel, it should be 
noted that these four categories are mutually exclusive.   13 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of key variables, again by PT status and contract 
type.  Comparison of the (raw) hourly wages indicates that the highest wages are paid in 
standard work arrangements (FT under a permanent contract), and that they are lower for 
more flexible work arrangements with the greatest reduction being associated with working 
PT under a fixed-term contract.
12  Table 3 depicts means of key variable by motherhood 
status.  Both states involving PT work are less frequent among childless women.  In contrast, 
the opposite is true for working FT under fixed-term contracts, which is a more frequent 
among the childless than in the whole sample. With regard to the other variables the picture is 
quite similar to the one observed for the whole sample.  
 
IV.  Results 
Tables A.1 displays means and standard deviations of the posterior distribution of the model 
parameters that can be interpreted as coefficients and standard errors from a Maximum 
Likelihood estimation.  However, for ease of interpretation, we focus our discussion on the 
cumulative effects of different employment states shown in Table 4.  Before we proceed to 
discuss the results, it is worth highlighting that, in contrast with the literature, which focuses 
on PT/FT wage differentials by type of contract, we compare the effects to the reference 
situation of working FT in a permanent contract, as this is the most common employment 
situation in Spain and our econometric approach allows us to do so. 
Wage Differentials due to First Quarter Work Arrangement  
                                                 
12 Our measure of pay is hourly earnings, calculated as annual earnings excluding overtime divided by total 
contractual hours, deflated by the 2006 price deflator.  Because our data set collects information on contractual 
annual hours (as opposed to actual annual hours worked), we follow Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas 
(forthcoming) to impute effective hours worked as follows.  First, using the Spanish Time Use Survey, we 
regressed hours worked against contractual hours, a part-time dummy, age, education, two-digit industry 
dummies and occupation dummies (estimates available from authors upon request).  Then, using these estimated 
coefficients, we calculated fitted hours worked for the women in our CSWH sample.  The concern here is that 
contractual hours consistently underreport actual hours worked for PT workers relative to FT workers, leading 
to a differential measurement error in hours by PT status.  Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas 
(forthcoming) show that by imputing effective hours worked in the explained way this concern is addressed. 
 14 
 
The first column of Table 4 presents the estimated marginal effects of having worked in a 
particular employment state for one quarter, as well as the period’s returns to experience 
(relative to the baseline state, which is working FT with a permanent contract).  Thus it gives 
our ceteris paribus estimates of the wage effect of the first quarter employment situation in a 
particular employment state given the employment history.   
  The results from Panel A indicate a large and significant PT/FT hourly wage gap 
ranging between 6 and 8 percentage points.  This gap can be interpreted as a quick drop in 
wages associated with PT work.  Interestingly, this wage differential is almost as large for 
women working under a fixed-term contract than for those under a permanent contract, 
suggesting that, on average, having a permanent contract does not protect women against the 
negative wage effects of PT work.  Likely reasons for wages growing less in PT jobs are that 
working in these jobs may involve less training, less possibilities to reach managerial 
positions and fewer chances to stand out by managing projects or doing extra work.  Our 
econometric model allows for the possibility that the wage effect of PT under fixed-term 
contracts is not just the combination of PT under a permanent contract and FT under a fixed-
term contract but that PT under a fixed-term contract involves its own - potentially different - 
wage effect. It turns out that the effect of PT under a fixed-term contract does not differ 
strongly from the effect of PT under a permanent contract, but differs a lot from the wage 
effect of FT under a fixed-term contract.  If we compare the PT/FT wage differential within 
contract types, we find a higher PT/FT wage differential among fixed-term workers than 
among permanent workers, as found by Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas 
(forthcoming). 
   Looking at the wage effect of having worked FT under a fixed-term contract for a 
quarter, we find that there is a small wage premium of currently working under a fixed-term 
contract (shown in the third row in Panel A, Table 4).  Following the theory of compensating 
wage differences, this small premium might reflect some compensation for less job security 15 
 
and potentially less job related benefits (see Booth et al., 2002).  It is, however, worth 
highlighting that this fixed-term-contract premium is conditional on the complete history.  
Thus, given that those women with a more disadvantaged history are those who select into 
fixed-term contracts, this small premium does in no way contradict that wages are, on 
average, lower in the secondary segment of the labour market than in the primary (as found 
by Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Booth et al., 2002; Dolado, et al., 2002, and De la Rica, 
2004, among others).   
  Because average effects may hide important differences across groups, column 1 of 
Panels B and C presents similar results estimated separately by motherhood status.  We find 
that heterogeneity exists.  Indeed, the PT/FT hourly wage differential for childless women 
working under a permanent contract doubles that of mothers.  However, the opposite is true 
for women working under a fixed-term contract.  The reason behind the smaller wage gap 
among mothers working under a permanent contract is likely to be related to a novel and 
liberal Spanish law implemented in 1999 that granted mothers with children under seven the 
right to reduce their work-week schedule (with a proportionate reduction in their weekly 
salary), and (most importantly) protected them against dismissal.  While this law was binding 
among women with permanent contracts, it was not among those with fixed-term contracts as 
employers only had to wait for the contract to expire to let them go.  Fernández-Kranz and 
Rodríguez-Planas, 2011, find evidence corroborating this asymmetry in the effectiveness of 
the law. 
Cumulative Returns to PT Work 
We turn now to the results of the cumulative effects of PT work.  The parameter estimates of 
the wage equation with regard to employment status and contract-type in the past (shown in 
Table A.1) answer the question of how much it harms to have worked in a particular situation 
in the past (irrespective of the current work situation).  Summing up these marginal effects 
one can come up with estimates of the cumulative effects of having worked in PT during a 16 
 
given number of quarters, or years.  For ease of exposure, this is what is shown in columns 2 
through 9 of Table 4.  For example, the value in column 5 indicates the cumulative wage 
effect of having worked PT during the past two years.  Technically, the cumulative effects 
and their standard errors are obtained by obtaining a draw of the posterior distribution of the 
cumulative effect of interest for each iteration of the Gibbs sampler and then estimating from 
the resulting draws their mean and standard deviation.  As such the cumulative returns to 
working two years PT in a fixed-term contract is calculated by adding up the draws of the 
model parameter for working PT and in a fixed-term PT contract in the current quarter and in 
the last eight quarters.  
Two important conclusions emerge from these results.  First, the negative wage return 
due to PT work grows with each additional quarter or year in PT work.  This clearly indicates 
that the returns to experience in PT work are lower than in FT work, regardless of contract 
type. Because these estimates come from adding the parameters for working PT in the past, 
these results also imply that the PT wage gap is persistent across time.  For example, having 
worked PT under a permanent contract four years ago carries a negative wage return for 
current wages of 1.3%.
13  This persistence implies that even short and temporary spells of PT 
work will have long lasting negative consequences for a woman’s labour career.   
Second, the results indicate that the cumulative effects of PT work under a permanent 
contract grow faster for childless women than for women with children.  For example, after 
six years of continuous PT work, the PT/FT wage gap has widen to 25 percent in the case of 
childless women compared to 13 percent in the case of women with children.  This larger 
wage effect indicates that working PT under a permanent contract leads to particularly low 
returns to experience for women without family responsibilities. 
Another advantage of our methodological approach is that we can also evaluate the 
wage effects of intermittent labour behaviour.  The last rows of Panels A through C in Table 
                                                 
13 The marginal returns are available from the authors upon request. 17 
 
4 show the negative wage return of non-employment in the past.  As one would expect, a 
history of non-employment has worse wage consequences than working PT.  For example, 
having interrupted employment for the last year goes along with a wage differential of 15% 
(relative to permanent FT work). This wage gap further increases to 35% after an interruption 
of six years.  These results put the PT/FT hourly wage differential into perspective. While it 
is true that, on the one hand, experience in PT work is less rewarded than in FT work; on the 
other hand, the effects are not as detrimental on women’s wages as interrupting employment. 
Variance and Covariance Parameters 
Table 5 shows means and standard deviations of the posterior distribution of the variance 
parameters.  The estimated variance parameters suggest that an important part of the variance 
is on the individual level in all three equations, indicating that time-constant unobserved 
heterogeneity is important, especially in the wage equation (where it represents 83%).  While 
this ratio is somewhat lower for the contract equation (23%) and the employment equation 
(33%), they are far from insignificant.  The positive correlation between the unobserved 
individual effect of the wage equation and the employment equation suggests that, with 
regard to time-constant unobservables, those women who have unobservables leading to 
higher wages also tend to have unobservables leading to a higher employment propensity.  
Consistent with this, the negative correlation of the unobserved individual effect of the wage 
equation and the contract equation indicates that the unobserved individual characteristics 
that lead to a higher propensity to have a fixed-term contract tend to go along with those 
characteristics that give rise to lower wages.  Finally, the individual correlation between the 
employment equation and the contract equation is also negative, indicating that those time-
constant unobserved individual characteristics that lead to a higher propensity to have a 
fixed-term contract tend to go along with those characteristics that lead to a lower 
employment propensity.  Bottom line, our results support the view that those women with 
unobservable characteristics favourable to market work tend to work under permanent 18 
 
contracts and in FT jobs.  All variance and covariance parameter are significant.  Given the 
size and significance of the covariance parameters, the estimation results confirm that the 
heterogeneity on the individual level should not be neglected.  The subgroup analysis reveals 
similar results. 
 
V.  Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is shown in Table 6 and indicates that our results are remarkably robust to 
using more standard methods.  Moreover, it also highlights that it is crucial to account for the 
history with regard to PT, FT and NE and with regard to contracts and interdependencies of 
these.  Finally, we confirm that individual heterogeneity must be taken into account.  
Assuming independence of: the work history, the current employment, and contract 
status, with individual’s time-constant unobserved heterogeneity—as it is assumed in the 
standard RE model with one equation—is incorrect because we have found strong and 
significant correlations between the random effects of the three equations in the variance-
covariance matrix.  Thus, it may come as a surprise that the standard RE model (with one 
instead of our three equations and shown in Panel A of Table 6) delivers similar results to 
those presented in the main section of the paper.  The explanation for this is not that the 
assumptions of the standard RE model are fulfilled, but instead that the different correlations 
work in opposite directions, partially cancelling out.  Economically this means that the size of 
the positive unobserved selection into FT employment and the size of the negative selection 
into fixed-term contracts, given the link between them, state dependence, and observed 
characteristics, are such in our data that they partly offset each other.  If and to what extent 
this happens cannot be anticipated ex-ante and may differ in other settings, thus by no means 
depreciating our technique.   19 
 
Alternatively, we have compared our results with those from using a FE approach 
(shown in Panel B of Table 6).  A FE estimator solely relies on within identification which 
may be a drawback especially when estimating a very flexible specification (as we do in this 
paper), and when observing only a small part of the woman’s work history.  It turns out that 
sample size is sufficiently large and our panel is sufficiently long, that the FE estimator 
performs quite well in replicating our results.  Finally, we use pooled OLS to estimate our 
wage equation (see Panel C).  POLS results are strongly biased delivering large PT/FT wage 
differentials.  If anything, these results confirm the importance of accounting for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity when estimating the PT wage differential.  Regarding the effect of 
working FT in a fixed-term contract, the POLS estimation shows large cumulative negative 
returns to this type of work due to neglecting unobserved heterogeneity.  That said, note that 
even POLS estimation does not suggest a (strong) negative first quarter effect of working FT 
under a fixed-term contract.  As an additional robustness check, we re-estimated the wage 
equation by POLS excluding the labour market history, and we found an hourly wage gap for 
working under a fixed-term contract of 16%.  This exercise highlights the importance of 
including the employment history with regard to NE, PT, and FT and the contract-history and 
interactions of these when estimating the wage effects of contract-types.
14  Moreover, it 
indicates that a large part of the apparent fixed-term wage gap seems to be driven by the 
different work experience of women in the primary and in the secondary segments of the 
labour market.   
Finally, we checked whether adding industry dummies, occupation dummies and 
seniority on the job to the wage equation influences our results.  As mentioned before, we did 
not include these variables into the wage equation because they may be outcomes to 
experience in different work arrangements.  As a sensitivity exercise, we re-estimated the 
                                                 
14 A FE estimator of a wage equation without history and PT controls indicates a return to working under a 
fixed-term contract of -3.6%; thus part of the history effect is captured by time-constant unobserved 
heterogeneity. 20 
 
wage equation with different specification choices including industry and occupation 
dummies, and a variable measuring elapsed seniority on the job.  To make this exercise 
feasible, we used both the standard FE and the RE estimators.  Again, the results are robust to 
the main findings of the paper.   
 
VI.  Conclusion 
In this study we use Spanish Social Security records to examine the wage differences between 
PT and full-time female workers. Employing a three-equation RE model, we use a different 
methodological approach than the previous literature which offers new perspectives. We 
follow BFKZ, 2010, and explicitly model the participation/employment and PT status and 
type of contract mobility decisions, which, in turn, define the individual’s experience in 
different segments of the labour market. We introduce into the wage equation a summary of 
the workers’ entire observed career path. The three-equation system is estimated 
simultaneously using data from Spanish Social Security records and MCMC estimation.  
Our results indicate that there is a large and persistent FT/PT hourly wage differential. 
Having a permanent contract protects against the PT wage gap only partially and only for 
mothers.  Importantly, our results show that work experience is rewarded less in PT work than 
in full-time work and these (low) returns are quite similarly low in the two segments of the 
labour market.   
Also, our results highlight the importance of controlling for work history in this type 
of studies.  More precisely, we find that part of the PT/FT wage differential can be explained 
by differential employment histories of PT and full-time workers.  This is important not only 
for the estimation of the PT wage differential but also for the estimation of the wage effects of 
other types of flexible work.  For example, after controlling for work history, we find that 
there is no negative wage return for working under fixed-term contracts.   21 
 
The persistence of the negative effects of PT work draws a bleak picture for rigid 
labour markets where this type of work arrangement is often presented as an alternative to add 
flexibility and to reduce the high levels of unemployment.  Furthermore, our results imply that 
work-family conciliation through work-week reduction carries a significant negative wage 
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Table 1 
Experience in Different Employment States.  1996-2006 CSWH Pooled Sample 
 (Means with Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
  FT, Permanent  PT, Permanent  FT, Fixed-term  PT, Fixed-term 
Dummy for respective employment 
status in t 
0.876 (0.329)   0.0341 (0.181)   0.077 (0.267)   0.013 (0.111)  
Years of experience in FT, 
Permanent observed since initial 
period of sample 
 5.011 (2.812)  4.137 (2.617)   1.668 (2.230)    2.597 (2.548) 
Years of experience in PT, 
Permanent observed since initial 
period of sample 
0.020 (0.242)  2.063 (1.862)   0.022 (0.241)   0.074 (0.433) 
Years of experience in FT, Fixed-
term observed since initial period of 
sample 
0.104 (0.576)  0.227 (0.914)  2.457 (2.379)   0.381 (0.965)  
Years of experience in PT, Fixed-
term observed since initial period of 
sample 
0.016 (0.206)  0.231 (0.774)   0.048 (0.312)   1.787 (2.104) 
Years of FT experience in initial 
period 
7.326 (3.774)  6.595 (3.268)  4.848 (2.613)  5.630 (3.020) 
Years of PT experience in initial 
period 
0.171 (0.602)  0.503 (1.038)  0.210 (0.576)  1.004 (1.409) 





Descriptive Statistics.  1996-2006 CSWH Pooled Sample 
 (Means with Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
  FT, Permanent  PT, Permanent  FT, Fixed-term  PT, Fixed-term 
Log hourly wage  2.386 (0.409)  2.046 (0.457)  2.277 (0.462)  1.806 (0.577) 
Hourly wage in Euro  11.766 (4.538)  8.623 (4.485)   11.065 (11.266)  7.443 (7.067)  
Age from 23 to 29  0.072 (0.258)  0.013 (0.115)  0.102 (0.302)  0.028 (0.166) 
Age from 30 to 34  0.315 (0.465)  0.271 (0.444)  0.389 (0.488)  0.219 (0.413) 
Age from 35 to 39  0.393 (0.488)  0.447 (0.497)  0.309 (0.462)  0.429 (0.495) 
Age from 40 to 45  0.219 (0.414)  0.269 (0.443)  0.120 (0.340)  0.324 (0.468) 
Less than secondary education  0.322 (0.467)  0.455 (0.498)  0.315 (0.465)  0.599 (0.490) 
Secondary education  0.410 (0.492)  0.379 (0.485)  0.230 (0.458)  0.269 (0.444) 
More than secondary education  0.268 (0.443)  0.166 (0.372)  0.385 (0.487)  0.132 (0.338) 
No child  0.486 (0.500)  0.251 (0.434)  0.582 (0.493)  0.342 (0.474) 
Youngest child younger than 2 years  0.155 (0.362)  0.309 (0.462)  0.123 (0.328)  0.123 (0.329) 
Youngest child 3 years  0.046 (0.209)  0.084 (0.277)  0.031 (0.173)  0.043 (0.202) 
Youngest child 4 to 6 years  0.112 (0.315)  0.142 (0.349)  0.073 (0.259)  0.114 (0.318) 
Youngest child 7 to 29 years  0.202 (0.401)  0.214 (0.450)  0.192 (0.394)  0.379 (0.485) 
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Table 3 
Key Descriptive Statistics by Motherhood Status 
(Means with Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
Panel A:  Mothers (to be) 
  FT, Permanent  PT, Permanent  FT, Fixed-term  PT, Fixed-term 
Dummy of status in t   0.875 (0.330)  0.042 (0.202)  0.068 (0.251)  0.014 (0.119) 
Raw wage in Euro   11.81 (4.55)  8.68 (4.50)  10.47 (8.38)  7.24 (6.96) 
University degree   0.254 (0.435)  0.162 (0.369)  0.310 (0.462)  0.114 (0.318) 
Less than secondary school   0.340 (0.474)  0.447 (0.497)  0.397 (0.489)  0.627 (0.484) 
Years of experience in FT, Permanent 
 observed since initial period of sample  5.083 (2.813)  4.145 (2.648)  1.791 (2.340)  2.456 (2.549) 
 
Panel B:  Childless Women 
  FT, Permanent  PT, Permanent  FT, Fixed-term  PT, Fixed-term 
Dummy of status in t   0.877  (0.328)  0.021 (0.143)   0.092 (0.289)  0.009 (0.097)  
Raw wage in Euro   11.70 (4.53)   8.43 (4.44)  11.75 (13.87)  7.94 (7.29) 
University degree   0.290 (0.454)   0.180 (0.384)   0.473 (0.499)   0.175 (0.380) 
Less than secondary school   0.293 (0.455)   0.481 (0.450)   0.219 (0.414)  0.531 (0.499)  
Years of experience in FT, Permanent 




Estimated Cumulative Returns to a Particular Labour Force State 
(Reference Category: FT Work under a Permanent Contract) 
Panel A:  All Women 
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Panel B:  Mothers (to be) 
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Panel C:  Childless Women 
Quarters / Years in that state 















































































Note: Standard errors are multiplied by 100 and are in parentheses. 
   25 
 
Table 5 
Variance and Covariance Parameters 
(Means and Standard Deviations) 
 
 
Panel A:  
Whole Sample 
Panel B:  
Mothers (to be) 
Panel C:  
Childless 
  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
  Variance and Covariance Parameters 
Var(α
W)  0.1053 0.0012 0.1053 0.0016 0.1095 0.0020 
Var(ε
 W)  0.0211 0.0001 0.0219 0.0001 0.0202 0.0002 
Var(α
C)  0.2933 0.0204 0.3454 0.0267 0.3528 0.0267 
Var(α
E)  0.4969 0.0162 0.4609 0.0187 0.5791 0.0323 
Cov(α
W, α
E)  0.0470 0.0028 0.0485 0.0035 0.0392 0.0050 
Cov(α
W, α
C)  -0.0254 0.0033  -0.0285 0.0045  -0.0218 0.0051 
Cov(α
C, α












  )  0.3319 0.0072 0.3154 0.0088 0.3665 0.0130 
Corr(α
W, α
E)  0.2053 0.0118 0.2204 0.0148 0.1559 0.0191 
Corr(α
W, α
C)  -0.1448 0.0179  -0.1498 0.0224  -0.1111 0.0252 
Corr(α
C, α




Sensitivity Analysis: Estimated Cumulative Returns Estimated from Alternative Models 
All Women 
Panel A: Standard RE Model 
  Quarters/Years in that state 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 








































































Panel B: FE Model 
  Quarters/Years in that state 
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Panel C: Pooled OLS 
  Quarters/Years in that state 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 
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Table A.1 
Main Specification (Means and Standard Deviations of Parameters) 
 
  Whole Sample  Mothers (to be)  Childless 
  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
  Wage Equation 
PT  -0.0018  0.0036 0.0075 0.0042 -0.0305  0.0068 
PTlag1  -0.0601 0.0045  -0.0592 0.0053  -0.0678 0.0086 
PTlag2   -0.0223 0.0038  -0.0258 0.0046  -0.0148 0.0067 
PTlag3  -0.0194 0.0038  -0.0156 0.0047  -0.0283 0.0067 
PTlag4  -0.0179 0.0036  -0.0122 0.0044  -0.0316 0.0066 
PTlag5 + PTlag6 + PTlag7 + PTlag8   -0.0020 0.0010  -0.0037 0.0011  0.0034  0.0018 
PTlag9 + PTlag10 + PTlag11 + PTlag12  0.0009 0.0010 0.0013 0.0012 -0.0007  0.0019 
PTlag13 + PTlag14 + PTlag15 + PTlag16  -0.0033 0.0010  -0.0006 0.0011  -0.0100 0.0019 
PTlag17 + PTlag18 + ... + PTlag40  -0.0018 0.0003  -0.0011 0.0004  -0.0053 0.0007 
NElag1  -0.0310 0.0032  -0.0294 0.0040  -0.0352 0.0052 
NElag2   -0.0357 0.0028  -0.0290 0.0035  -0.0481 0.0045 
NElag3  -0.0304 0.0027  -0.0305 0.0035  -0.0313 0.0044 
NElag4  -0.0519 0.0025  -0.0496 0.0032  -0.0570 0.0042 
NElag5 + NElag6 +NElag7 +NElag8   -0.0201 0.0007  -0.0181 0.0009  -0.0243 0.0012 
NElag9 + NElag10 + NElag11 +NElag12  -0.0121 0.0007  -0.0118 0.0009  -0.0132 0.0012 
NElag13 +NElag14 + NElag15 +NElag16  -0.0137 0.0007  -0.0106 0.0009  -0.0198 0.0012 
NElag17 + NElag18 + ... + NElag40  -0.0016 0.0003  -0.0001 0.0004  -0.0054 0.0006 
FIX and FT  0.0293 0.0026 0.0357 0.0035 0.0220 0.0039 
FIX and PT  -0.0496 0.0050  -0.0650 0.0062  -0.0049 0.0089 
FIXlag1 and FTlag1  -0.0174 0.0029  -0.0261 0.0039  -0.0066 0.0043 
FIXlag1 and PTlag1  0.0321 0.0057 0.0232 0.0071 0.0581 0.0103 
FIXlag2 +FIXlag3 +FIXlag4 and PT in none  0.0005 0.0008 0.0011 0.0012 -0.0002  0.0012 
FIXlag2 +FIXlag3 +FIXlag4 and PT in min. one  0.0036 0.0016 0.0034 0.0020 0.0068 0.0029 
FIXlag5 +FIXlag6 +FIXlag7 +FIXlag8   -0.0001 0.0005  -0.0000 0.0007  -0.0001 0.0008 
FIXlag9 +FIXlag10 + ... +FIXlag40  -0.0003 0.0001  -0.0002 0.0002  -0.0004 0.0002 
Not in sample lag2  -0.0651 0.0025  -0.0626 0.0032  -0.0665 0.0037 
Not in sample lag3  -0.0556 0.0022  -0.0533 0.0029  -0.0567 0.0033 
Not in sample lag4  -0.0477 0.0020  -0.0449 0.0026  -0.0498 0.0030 
Not in sample in lag5 + ... lag6 + ... lag7 + ...lag8   -0.0348 0.0013  -0.0343 0.0016  -0.0345 0.0019 
Not in sample in lag9 + ...+ ...lag12  0.0060 0.0009 0.0053 0.0011 0.0067 0.0013 
Not in sample in lag13 + ...  + ...lag16  0.0058 0.0007 0.0057 0.0010 0.0058 0.0011 
Not in sample in lag17 + ...  + ...lag40  0.0114 0.0011 0.0135 0.0015 0.0083 0.0016 
PT in t=0  -0.2030 0.0212  -0.1994 0.0254  -0.2594 0.0510 
NE in t=0  -0.0631 0.0169  -0.0689 0.0200  -0.0775 0.0326 
Experience in FT in t=0  0.0133 0.0009 0.0120 0.0012 0.0157 0.0016 
Experience in PT in t=0  -0.0140 0.0036  -0.0128 0.0045  -0.0157 0.0059 
FIX in t=0  -0.0221 0.0112  -0.0088 0.0166  -0.0402 0.0171 
Experience in FIX in t=0  -0.0033 0.0132  -0.0275 0.0178  0.0277  0.0190 
Age from 23 to 29  -0.0201 0.0019  -0.0187 0.0025  -0.0223 0.0029 
Age from 30 to 34  -0.0038 0.0010  -0.0029 0.0013  -0.0050 0.0015 
Age from 40 to 45  -0.0076 0.0011  -0.0058 0.0014  -0.0119 0.0017 
Less than secondary education  -0.2198 0.0063  -0.2228 0.0084  -0.2149 0.0103 
More than secondary education  0.3540 0.0066 0.3539 0.0093 0.3590 0.0095 
No child  0.0188 0.0018 0.0232 0.0023    
Youngest child younger than 2 years  -0.0033 0.0014  -0.0014 0.0016     
Youngest child 3 years  -0.0052 0.0015  -0.0038 0.0017     
Youngest child 4 to 6years  -0.0040 0.0012  -0.0033 0.0012     
1997  0.0562 0.0105 0.0587 0.0131 0.0406 0.0155 
1998  0.0481 0.0094 0.0514 0.0116 0.0340 0.0137 
1999  0.0493 0.0082 0.0549 0.0102 0.0327 0.0121 
2000  0.0309 0.0071 0.0348 0.0088 0.0183 0.0104 
2001  0.0264 0.0059 0.0294 0.0074 0.0162 0.0087 
2002  0.0209 0.0048 0.0241 0.0059 0.0116 0.0070 
2003  0.0240 0.0036 0.0263 0.0045 0.0171 0.0053 
2004  0.0144 0.0025 0.0175 0.0031 0.0076 0.0037 
2005  0.0124 0.0015 0.0143 0.0019 0.0087 0.0022 
April to June  -0.0061 0.0007  -0.0059 0.0009  -0.0061 0.0011 
July to September  -0.0102 0.0009  -0.0101 0.0011  -0.0099 0.0013 28 
 
October to December  -0.0143 0.0011  -0.0138 0.0014  -0.0139 0.0016 
UR in province (deviation)  -0.0003 0.0001  -0.0005 0.0002  0.0001  0.0002 
GDP growth in province (deviation)  0.0487 0.0162 0.0648 0.0211 0.0167 0.0254 
Constant  2.1581 0.0082 2.1723 0.0108 2.1566 0.0121 
  Contract Equation 
FIXlag1  3.6431 0.0408 3.6708 0.0617 3.6320 0.0736 
FIXlag2   -0.0266 0.0368  -0.0250 0.0503  -0.0469 0.0577 
FIXlag3  0.1461 0.0381 0.1517 0.0524 0.1408 0.0598 
FIXlag4  0.0177 0.0367 -0.0066  0.0505 0.0351 0.0571 
FIXlag5 + FIXlag6 + FIXlag7 + FIXlag8   0.0863 0.0117 0.0907 0.0160 0.0718 0.0182 
FIXlag9 + FIXlag10 + FIXlag11 + FIXlag12  0.0397 0.0129 0.0442 0.0174 0.0266 0.0201 
FIXlag13 + FIXlag14 + FIXlag15 + FIXlag16  -0.0559 0.0120  -0.0880 0.0165  -0.0305 0.0194 
PT  0.4620 0.0384 0.3255 0.0484 0.7476 0.0700 
PTlag1  -0.1905 0.0549  -0.1513 0.0685  -0.2638 0.0889 
PTlag2 + PTlag3 + PTlag4  -0.0460 0.0229  -0.0143 0.0290  -0.1086 0.0392 
PTlag5 + PTlag6 + PTlag7 + PTlag8   0.0427 0.0192 0.0517 0.0234 0.0258 0.0354 
PTlag9 + PTlag10 + PTlag11 + PTlag12  -0.0569 0.0187  -0.0702 0.0230  -0.0104 0.0355 
NElag1  2.6261 0.0475 2.5961 0.0698 2.7362 0.0863 
NElag2 +NElag3 +NElag4  0.1619 0.0166 0.1762 0.0222 0.1649 0.0276 
NElag5 + NElag6 +NElag7 +NElag8   0.0581 0.0129 0.0792 0.0171 0.0285 0.0210 
NElag9 + NElag10 + NElag11 +NElag12  0.0360 0.0129 0.0382 0.0162 0.0346 0.0211 
FIX in t=0  0.3842 0.0686 0.4051 0.1103 0.5087 0.1231 
Experience in FIX in t=0  0.5107 0.0807 0.5970 0.1150 0.4539 0.1177 
Not in sample lag2  0.3479 0.0441 0.4515 0.0677 0.2570 0.0713 
Not in sample lag3  0.3114 0.0423 0.3287 0.0643 0.3119 0.0692 
Not in sample lag4  0.2592 0.0417 0.3788 0.0629 0.1255 0.0663 
Not in sample in lag5 + ... lag6 + ... lag7 + ...lag8   0.1442 0.0183 0.1622 0.0292 0.1216 0.0295 
Not in sample in lag9 + ...+ ...lag12  -0.1149 0.0269  -0.1235 0.0403  -0.1065 0.0417 
Not in sample in lag13 + ...  + ...lag16  -0.0127 0.0238  -0.0279 0.0332  0.0080  0.0349 
Not in sample in lag17 + ...  + ...lag40  0.0138 0.0342 0.0567 0.0496 -0.0217  0.0526 
Age from 23 to 29  0.1827 0.0512 0.2138 0.0761 0.1646 0.0774 
Age from 30 to 34  0.0253 0.0251 0.0074 0.0393 0.0432 0.0387 
Age from 40 to 45  -0.0545 0.0299  -0.0255 0.0369  -0.0956 0.0520 
Less than secondary education  0.1099 0.0477 0.1335 0.0708 0.0805 0.0910 
More than secondary education  0.0619 0.0544 0.0223 0.0738 0.1092 0.0754 
No child  -0.0244  0.0408 0.0111 0.0620    
Youngest child younger than 2 years  -0.2182 0.0391  -0.1698 0.0480     
Youngest child 3 years  -0.1064 0.0524  -0.0791 0.0581     
Youngest child 4 to 6years  -0.0740 0.0380  -0.0548 0.0423     
1997  -0.4784 0.0692  -0.5254 0.1099  -0.4737 0.1330 
1998  -0.4529 0.0651  -0.4822 0.1053  -0.4283 0.1274 
1999  -0.3778 0.0651  -0.3807 0.0972  -0.3914 0.1180 
2000  -0.1452 0.0523  -0.1334 0.0767  -0.1565 0.0884 
2001  -0.0725 0.0453  -0.0754 0.0673  -0.0705 0.0761 
2002  -0.0080 0.0389  -0.0545 0.0586  0.0400  0.0601 
2003  0.0103 0.0342 -0.0139  0.0480 0.0336 0.0537 
2004  0.0696 0.0305 0.0548 0.0425 0.0861 0.0466 
2005  0.0869 0.0268 0.0813 0.0379 0.0966 0.0419 
April to June  0.1194 0.0230 0.1619 0.0314 0.0704 0.0348 
July to September  0.0752 0.0225 0.1426 0.0315 -0.0125  0.0358 
October to December  0.0773 0.0224 0.1376 0.0311 0.0028 0.0349 
UR in province (deviation)  -0.0002  0.0038 0.0004 0.0048 -0.0001  0.0054 
GDP growth in province (deviation)  -0.2397  0.5351 0.0733 0.7042 -0.6148  0.8391 
Constant  -3.1721 0.0701  -3.3147 0.1064  -3.2029 0.1153 
  Employment Equation 
PTlag1  -2.192 0.0305 -2.203 0.0376 -2.204 0.0679 
PTlag2 + PTlag3 + PTlag4  -0.0116 0.0108  -0.0109 0.0126  -0.0147 0.0219 
PTlag5 + PTlag6 + PTlag7 + PTlag8   -0.0191 0.0075  -0.0209 0.0087  -0.0126 0.0149 
PTlag9 + PTlag10 + PTlag11 + PTlag12  0.0013 0.0067 -0.0012  0.0077 0.0071 0.0133 
NElag1  -3.123 0.0239 -3.2060  0.0307 -2.9731  0.0496 
NElag2 +NElag3 +NElag4  -0.0221 0.0085  -0.0145 0.0104  -0.0346 0.0152 
NElag5 + NElag6 +NElag7 +NElag8   0.0165 0.0064 0.0096 0.0077 0.0288 0.0116 
NElag9 + NElag10 + NElag11 +NElag12  0.0814 0.0061 0.0757 0.0073 0.0964 0.0113 
FIXlag1 and FTlag1  -0.9409 0.0280  -0.9499 0.0370  -0.9255 0.0509 
FIXlag1 and PTlag1  -0.0381 0.0328  -0.0511 0.0392  0.0120  0.0622 29 
 
FIXlag2 +FIXlag3 +FIXlag4 and PT in none  0.1295 0.0107 0.1444 0.0139 0.1070 0.0177 
FIXlag2 +FIXlag3 +FIXlag4 and PT in min. one  0.0414 0.0132 0.0377 0.0158 0.0549 0.0248 
FIXlag5 +FIXlag6 +FIXlag7 +FIXlag8   0.0168 0.0064 0.0091 0.0079 0.0280 0.0112 
PT in t=0  -0.8221 0.0645  -0.8070 0.0748  -0.8861 0.1620 
NE in t=0  -1.023 0.0576 -1.023 0.0707 -1.019 0.1254 
Not in sample lag2  -0.0122 0.0302  -0.0658 0.0378  0.0738  0.0527 
Not in sample lag3  0.0056 0.0287 0.0101 0.0379 -0.0038  0.0485 
Not in sample lag4  -0.0510 0.0282  -0.0740 0.0354  -0.0213 0.0475 
Not in sample in lag5 + ... lag6 + ... lag7 + ...lag8   -0.0178 0.0119  -0.0206 0.0154  -0.0116 0.0200 
Not in sample in lag9 + ...+ ...lag12  0.0113 0.0163 0.0048 0.0202 0.0258 0.0269 
Not in sample in lag13 + ...  + ...lag16  0.0061 0.0129 0.0174 0.0160 -0.0179  0.0220 
Not in sample in lag17 + ...  + ...lag40  0.0083 0.0188 -0.0176  0.0235 0.0401 0.0322 
Age from 23 to 29  0.0588 0.0360 0.0283 0.0450 0.0815 0.0604 
Age from 30 to 34  -0.0330 0.0148  -0.0323 0.0180  -0.0416 0.0267 
Age from 40 to 45  0.1203 0.0166 0.1444 0.0205 0.0612 0.0312 
Less than secondary education  -0.2379 0.0386  -0.2321 0.0470  -0.2463 0.0686 
More than secondary education  0.0741 0.0448 0.0953 0.0563 0.0440 0.0724 
Experience in FT in t=0  0.0242 0.0068 0.0225 0.0068 0.0287 0.0123 
Experience in PT in t=0  -0.0114 0.0197  -0.0150 0.0210  -0.0021 0.0408 
No child  0.0504 0.0255 0.1218 0.0424    
Youngest child younger than 2 years  -0.4530 0.0229  -0.4415 0.0257     
Youngest child 3 years  -0.1757 0.0261  -0.1586 0.0275     
Youngest child 4 to 6 years  -0.1077 0.0206  -0.0981 0.0215     
1997  0.2084 0.0631 0.2090 0.0835 0.1965 0.1297 
1998  -0.0113 0.0558  -0.0046 0.0709  -0.0613 0.1017 
1999  -0.0860 0.0504  -0.0851 0.0628  -0.1226 0.0905 
2000  -0.2032 0.0438  -0.1860 0.0543  -0.2664 0.0766 
2001  -0.2961 0.0374  -0.2835 0.0454  -0.3320 0.0647 
2002  -0.3483 0.0318  -0.3083 0.0380  -0.4365 0.0535 
2003  -0.2812 0.0257  -0.2663 0.0310  -0.3174 0.0444 
2004  -0.3048 0.0209  -0.2858 0.0250  -0.3474 0.0363 
2005  -0.2468 0.0172  -0.2378 0.0208  -0.2665 0.0306 
April to June  0.0273 0.0123 0.0267 0.0142 0.0273 0.0219 
July to September  0.0495 0.0123 0.0552 0.0149 0.0410 0.0221 
October to December  0.0297 0.0127 0.0256 0.0153 0.0411 0.0221 
UR in province (deviation)  0.0042 0.0022 0.0039 0.0027 0.0043 0.0040 
Constant  3.7002 0.0529 3.7803 0.0639 3.6129 0.0874 
 